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REVISED ARTICLE 2 AND MIXED
GOODS/INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR COURTS
Lee Kissman*
I. INTRODUCTION
For the first time since its widespread enactment by
almost every state in the early 1960s,1 and after more than a
decade of drafting and debates,2 Uniform Commercial Code
Revised Article 2 ("Revised Article 2") has been approved by
both the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws ("NCCUSL") and the American Law Institute
("ALI").3 The scope provision created significant difficulties
for the drafters with respect to whether and to what extent
Revised Article 2 should apply to computer information
transactions.' While the scope provision remains unchanged,5
* Comments Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 44. J.D./M.B.A.
Candidate, Santa Clara University School of Law and Leavey School of
Business; B.A. University of Michigan.
1. See Fred H. Miller, Modernizing the UCC for the New Millennium:
Introduction to a Collection on the New UCC, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 189, 191
(2000).
2. See Linda J. Rusch, A History and Perspective of Revised Article 2." The
Never Ending Saga of a Search for Balance, 52 SMU L. REV. 1683, 1685-86
(1999) (quoting Gene LeBrun, President of NCCUSL).
3. See The National Conference of Commissions on Uniform State Laws,
Work Concludes on Revision of Uniform Commercial Code Articles 2 and 2A
(May 14, 2003), at
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/DesktopModulesfNewsDisplay.aspx?ItemID=51.
4. See Ann Lousin, Proposed UCC 2-103 of the 2000 Version of the
Revision of Article 2, 54 SMU L. REV. 913, 913 (2001) (indicating that the
overriding scope issue of revised Article 2 is the role of computers and computer
information).
5. Compare 2002 Proposed Amendments to U.C.C. Art. 2 § 2-102 (2002),
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulcframe.htm, with National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Approved Amendments to
U.C.C., Part I, Short Title, General Construction and Subject Matter (2002) (on
file with author). Although a revised scope provision was proposed to NCCUSL,
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the Article's definition of "goods" has been revised to exclude
"information."' Because Article 2 applies to transactions in
goods, this revised definition potentially alters the scope of
the Article.7 This change may affect the source of law that
will be applied to mixed goods/information transactions, and
thus the rights and obligations of parties involved in these
transactions."
Part II of this comment will review the background of
Revised Article 2 and case law surrounding mixed
goods/information transactions.9  Within the context of
modern information technologies, Part II will discuss the
revision process and recent changes to the scope of Revised
Article 2.10 Further, Part II will review the two tests that
courts currently apply to determine source of law for mixed
transactions." Finally, Part II will discuss how courts have
thus far addressed source of law and implied warranties in
mixed goods/information transactions.
12
Part IV will analyze the potential effects of excluding
information from the scope of Revised Article 2.1" It will
explore the possible ramifications of a court's definition of
"information," as well as the application of a source of law
test.14 Part IV will also explore different sources of law that
courts may apply to mixed goods/information transactions
when Revised Article 2 does not apply.'" Finally, Part V will
recommend an approach that courts should take when
applying Revised Article 2 to certain mixed transaction
that organization did not approve it, and thus it was not submitted to ALI for
approval. See 2002 Proposed Amendments to U.C.C. Art. 2 § 2-102, supra.
6. Approved Draft Amendments to U.C.C. Art. 2 § 2-103(k) (2003),
copyright 2003 by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Reproduced with permission of the
permanent editorial board for the Uniform Commercial Code. All rights
reserved [hereinafter 2003 Approved Draft Amendments].
7. See Lousin, supra note 4, at 925 (indicating that the change to the
definition of "goods" in the 2000 draft altered the scope of the article). See 2003
Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, §§ 2-102, 2-103(k).
8. See 1 RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, § 9:2
(3d ed. 2002).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part IIA-C.
11. See infra Part II.D.
12. See infra Part II.E.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part IV.A.
15. See infra Part IV.B.
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disputes.6
II. BACKGROUND
The drafting, revision, and promulgation of the U.C.C. is
a unique process because two organizations, ALI and
NCCUSL, share in its management. 7 This partnership has
been successful in revising other U.C.C. articles in the past
decade." The project to revise Article 2 began in the late
1980s,'9 with the purpose of addressing a number of issues,
including the "status of software. 2 ° Since then, more than
seven drafts have been developed,' and few other U.C.C.
revisions have received as much attention and controversy.22
To a large extent, one of the main hurdles for the Article 2
16. See infra Part V.
17. See William J. Woodward, Private Legislation in the United States-
How the Uniform Commercial Code Becomes Law, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 451, 453
(1999). To date, although approved by ALI at its annual meeting in May 2003,
Revised Article 2 is subject to further editing before it is published in its final
form. See 2003 Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, at "Note." ALI
membership approved a tentative draft of Revised Article 2 in 2001 with the
understanding that any fundamental changes would require further approval
by the membership. See Council Approves Article 2 Amendments, 24 A.L.I.
RPT'R 5, 1, 3 (2002). At its annual meeting, the ALI membership approved
fundamental changes to that amendment, including the new definition of
"goods" and the commentary on scope, which will soon be proposed for
enactment by the states. See id.; see also National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, supra note 3. This approval was
foreshadowed by an announcement that the ALI Council, a group of members
elected by the ALI to manage the institute's affairs, endorsed Revised Article 2
in December 2002. See February 4 Letter to ALI Members on UCITA, 25 A.L.I.
RPT'R 2, 3 (2003).
18. See Richard E. Speidel, Revising UCC Article 2.: A View From the
Trenches, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 607, 610-11 (2001) (indicating that Article 9 was
revised and approved by ALI and NCCUSL and enacted by several states with
virtually no opposition). Revised Articles 3 and 4 were approved by both
organizations in 2002 "without controversy." See Institute Approves
Restatement Drafts and Revisions to UCC Articles 3 and 4, 24 A.L.I. RPT'R 4, 1
(2002). However, there is a considerable amount of scholarly criticism of the
U.C.C. revision process, particularly with respect to Article 2. See Bruce H.
Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Uniformity, Choice of Law and Software Sales,
8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 261, 276-83 (2000); Rusch, supra note 2, at 1688-93
(discussing the influence of interest groups and the problems associated with
non-uniform enactment).
19. See Richard E. Speidel, Introduction to Symposium on Proposed Revised
Article 2, 54 SMU L. REV. 787, 788-89 (2001).
20. See Riva F. Kinstlick, Overview of UCITA, Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act."A Broad Perspective, 673 PLI/PAT 59, 66 (2001).
21. See Speidel, supra note 19, at 789-90.
22. See Speidel, supra note 18, at 607-11.
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revision has been the scope provision.23 The scope provision
debate centers on the questions of how and whether Article 2
should address both "pure" computer information
transactions and transactions that involve both goods and
information. 4  Stated simply, the question is whether
computer information can or should be considered a "good"
with respect to the application of Article 2.25
A. History of the Revised Article 2 Scope Provision
An early approach adopted to address the issue of the
scope of Article 2 and information transactions was a "hub
and spoke" configuration. 26  Here, general contract law
principles common to both the sale of goods and the licensing
of software were to be consolidated in the "hub," while
separate "spokes," or chapters, would be devoted to issues
unique to each type of transaction.27 For example, one
chapter would include provisions that would apply only to
intangible information transactions, while a separate chapter
would contain the provisions unique to the sale of goods.28
However, some argued that this approach was unworkable
and could not adequately address the issues unique to each
type of transaction.29 NCCUSL abandoned the "hub and
spoke" approach and a committee was appointed to draft a
separate U.C.C. Article 2B that would govern information
transactions. 3°
While the drafting of Article 2B continued and the Article
was later withdrawn from the U.C.C. and promulgated by
NCCUSL as the Uniform Computer Information Transaction
Act ("UCITA"), the Article 2 drafting process failed to result
in an approved draft.3' Revised Article 2 scope provisions
23. See Lousin, supra note 4, at 913. In addition, the Preface to the July
2000 draft indicates that scope has been a controversial issue facing the
drafting committee. See id.
24. See Speidel, supra note 18, at 613-14.
25. See Lousin, supra note 4, at 913 (indicating that the overriding scope
issue is the role of computers and computer information).
26. See Rusch, supra note 2, at 1686.
27. See Kinstlick, supra note 20, at 66.
28. See id.; Rusch, supra note 2, at 1686-87 (indicating planned spokes for
goods, leases, and possibly software licenses).
29. See Rusch, supra note 2, at 1686; Kinstlick, supra note 20, at 66.
30. See Rusch, supra note 2, at 1686; Kinstlick, supra note 20, at 66.
31. See Article 2B Is Withdrawn from UCC and Will Be Promulgated by
NCCUSL as Separate Act, 21 A.L.I. RPT'R 3, 1, 7 (1999). In 1999, NCCUSL and
Vol: 44
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went through significant changes and multiple drafts, each
draft attempting to formulate a rule that would help
determine whether a given information transaction fell under
the purview of Revised Article 2.32 Concerns continued over
the boundaries of each project, specifically, the delineation
between the categories of transactions that involved goods
and those that involved computer information.33
ALI announced that Article 2B would not be adopted as part of the U.C.C.;
rather, it would be promulgated as UCITA by NCCUSL alone. ALI's Council of
the Institute indicated that it continued to have significant reservations about
key substantive provisions and the overall clarity and coherence of Article 2B.
See id.
32. See 2001 Annual Meeting Draft of U.C.C. Art. 2 § 2-103 (2001),
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulcframe.htm; 1999 Annual
Meeting Draft of U.C.C. Art. 2 § 2-103 (1999), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc frame.htm; 1997 Annual Meeting Draft of
U.C.C. Art. 2 § 2-103 (1997), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc-frame.htm; 1996 Annual Meeting Draft of
U.C.C. Art. 2 § 2-103 (1996), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulcframe.htm. The scope provision of the
1996 draft indicated that Article 2 applied to a transaction in which goods
predominate, a claim that goods failed to conform to terms of the contract even
if goods did not predominate, and agreements to install or repair goods. See
1996 Annual Meeting Draft of U.C.C. Art. 2 § 2-103, supra. In a mixed
transaction, Revised Article 2 applied to the goods portion and Article 2B to the
information portion. See id. The scope provision in the 1997 draft indicated
that Article 2 applied to the goods aspect of a mixed transaction, as well as the
sale of a computer program not specifically developed for a particular
transaction if it was embedded in goods other than a computer. See 1997
Annual Meeting Draft of U.C.C. Art. 2 § 2-103, supra. This version appeared to
adopt a gravaman approach for mixed transactions, but applied Article 2 to an
entire transaction if it involved certain types of embedded goods. See id. The
1999 revision also applied the gravaman approach, and applied Article 2 to the
whole transaction if it involved certain embedded goods, but excepted
transactions where access to the use of information was the material purpose.
See 1999 Annual Meeting Draft of U.C.C. Art. 2 § 2-103, supra. The 2001
revision indicated that Article 2 applied to the goods portion in a mixed
transaction, and included a list of factors to weigh when considering the
application of the article to a computer program in a mixed or embedded goods
transaction. See 2001 Annual Meeting Draft of U.C.C. Art. 2 § 2-103, supra.
33. See Speidel, supra note 19, at 792 (indicating that tension exists as to
the line beyond which sale of goods stops and the consumer information
transaction begins); Rusch, supra note 2, at 1687 (indicating that disagreements
arose about related provisions in UCITA and Article 2 drafts). In addition,
some of the drafting committee's decisions with regard to consumer issues were
controversial. See Michael M. Greenfield, The Role of Assent in Article 2 and
Article 9, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 289, 295-96 (1997). Finally, "[t]he differences
between UCITA and Revised Article 2 should be understood as having more to
do with the differences in views of the members of the two drafting committees
than with differences in the character of the goods covered by each statute."
Jean Braucher, When Your Refrigerator Orders Groceries Online and Your Car
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In the approved Revised Article 2, NCCUSL and ALI
abandoned a decade-long attempt to revise the scope
provision.34 Instead, Revised Article 2 simply redefines the
term "goods" by injecting the following statement: "The term
does not include information. . . ." The term "information"
itself remains undefined, although NCCUSL had proposed
but later failed to approve a definition.36 Now that Revised
Article 2 has been approved by both organizations, it will be
presented to state legislatures for enactment. A recent ALI
article discussed the Revised Article 2 draft prior to ALI's
approval and indicated, "[w]hether and to what extent Article
2 applies to a transaction that includes both goods and
information is to be determined from all the facts and
circumstances."38
B. Emerging Transactions and Scope of Law
The "facts and circumstances" that affect the scope of
Revised Article 2 consist of continuously emerging technology
Dials 911 After an Accident: Do We Really Need New Law for the World of
Smart Goods, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 241, 251 (2002).
34. 2003 Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, § 2-102.
35. Id. § 2-103(k). This Revised Article 2 draft defines goods as
all things that are movable at the time of identification to a contract for
sale. The term includes future goods, specially manufactured goods,
the unborn young of animals, growing crops, and other identified
things attached to realty as described in Section 2-107. The term does
not include information, the money in which the price is to be paid,
investment securities under Article 8, the subject matter of foreign
exchange transactions, and choses in action.
Id. Current Article 2 indicates that
"[g]oods" means all things (including specially manufactured goods)
which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale
other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment
securities (Article 8) and things in action. "Goods" also includes the
unborn young of animals and growing crops and other identified things
attached to realty as described in the section on goods to be severed
from realty (Section 2-107).
U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1995).
36. The NCCUSCL proposed definition states, "'Information' means data,
text, images, sounds, mask works, computer programs, software, databases, or
the like, including collections and compilations. The term includes computer
information." 2002 Proposed Amendments to U.C.C. Art. 2, supra note 5, § 2-
103(m).
37. See Woodward, supra note 17, at 453; Gregory E. Maggs, The Waning
Importance of Revisions to UC.C. Article 2, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 595, 597
(2003).
38. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Sales Laws, supra
note 3.
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transactions that seem to defy classification in terms of the
Article 2 definition of "moveable goods."39 To a certain extent,
our economy has shifted from goods-based transactions to
those involving digital information and services. ° Today,
transactions commonly involve the sale or licensing of
intangible products, for example, downloadable virus
protection software or access to information databases like
Westlaw.41  Transactions also take the form of mixed
transactions, which can involve both the sale of goods and the
licensing of information, as well as some services." For
example, system integration contracts involve software,
hardware, documentation, and the services of computer
programmers.43 In addition, embedded goods, a subset of the
mixed transaction, are becoming more prevalent.44 Embedded
goods consist of computer hardware or software designed for
and embedded in particular devices,45 such as automobiles,
cameras, toys, vending machines, washers and dryers,
medical devices, and smoke detectors.46
Although the first category of transactions consists of the
sale or licensing of only intangible information, many of
today's contracts consist of mixed goods/information
transactions, including embedded goods transactions, which
39. See id; Raymond T. Nimmer, Images and Contract Law-What Law
Applies to Transactions in Information, 36 HOuS. L. REV. 1, 32-34 (1999).
40. See Nimmer, supra note 39, at 3.
41. See JULIAN S. MILLSTEIN ET AL., DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET:
FORMS AND ANALYSIS § 8.04[2][b][ii] (6th ed. 2002) (listing online database
subscriptions and electronic updates as examples of information transactions);
Raymond T. Nimmer, Selling Products Online: Issues in Electronic Contracting,
467 PLI/PAT 823, 829-32 (1997) (indicating that "access to information"
contracts are not transfers of goods).
42. See Robert A. Feldman, Warranties and Computer Services. Past,
Present and Future, 10 COMPUTER LAW. 2, 4 (1993).
43. See id.
44. See John Anecki, Comment, Selling in Cyberspace: Electronic
Commerce and the Uniform Commercial Code, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 395, 403 (1997-
98); Donald R. Ballman, Comment, Software Tort. Evaluating Software Harm
by Duty of Function and Form, 3 CONN. INS. L.J. 417, 436-37 (1997).
45. For a definition of "embedded system, see searchEnterpriseLinux.com
Definitions, at
http://searchenterpriselinux.techtarget.com/sDefinition/O,,sid39_gci837507,00.ht
ml (last visited Sept. 2, 2003).
46. See id.; John G. Spooner, Embedded Chips Swarming Consumer Goods,
CNET NEWS.COM (Apr. 10, 2001), at http://news.com.com/2100-1040-
255617.html (indicating that a microprocessor is associated with almost every
part of an automobile).
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contain both tangible and intangible components. 47  The
Article 2 drafting committee has attempted to resolve the
issue of whether and to what extent the article should apply
to these types of emerging technologies that do not fit neatly
into the categories of "moveable good" or service.48
The source of law that applies to any transaction has
many important implications for the enforceability of rights
under a contract, including warranties and remedies. 49  If
state legislatures approve Revised Article 2 without changing
the scope provision or goods definition, courts dealing with
these emerging technologies will face conflicting legislation
with regard to source of law.5" Even though courts are
directed not to apply Revised Article 2 to a transaction that
involves information, they are directed to apply it to a
transaction that involves moveable goods.5 Although it is not
necessarily clear what law should apply to transactions that
consist solely of information,52 the law to apply becomes even
less clear when the transaction is mixed or involves
embedded goods." The Article 2 drafting committee has
struggled with this source of law issue, and has attempted to
formulate a rule that categorizes these emerging
technologies.54 Revised Article 2 indicates that the rule will
essentially be: exclude information. 5
47. SeeAnecki, supra note 44, at 397.
48. See Speidel, supra note 19, at 792 (discussing the struggle between
UCITA and Article 2 drafting committees regarding where to draw the line
between goods and information); Speidel, supra note 18, at 613-14; Anecki,
supra note 44, at 412-13 (discussing the 1997 scope provision and its approach
to mixed information transactions and embedded goods).
49. See NIMMER, supra note 8.
50. See Lousin, supra note 4, at 915-16 (discussing source of law issues for
the 2000 Article 2 amendment).
51. See 2003 Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, §§ 2-102, 2-103(k).
52. See i.LAN Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328,
332 (D. Mass. 2002) (observing that "software licenses exist in a legislative
void"); Nimmer, supra note 39, at 43 (noting the current turmoil in this area of
contract law and indicating that case law for services and information
transactions lacks consistency and clear articulation).
53. See Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 674 (3d Cir. 1991)
(indicating that software is an elusive concept and holding that it is a "good"
within the definition of U.C.C.).
54. See Lousin, supra note 4, at 913. Attempts to formulate a rule can be
seen in the numerous drafts of the scope provision. Each draft formulates a
rule to determine if a mixed transaction or embedded goods should fall under
the purview of Article 2. See discussion supra note 32.
55. See 2003 Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, § 2-103(k).
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C. What Is "Information?"
Because Revised Article 2 indicates that it does not apply
to "information," a court faced with a dispute that potentially
falls under the purview of Revised Article 2 will first have to
determine if a transaction actually involves "information," a
term left undefined in Revised Article 2.56 Several relevant
sources define "information."7 For example, the drafting
committee proposed a definition, and although it was not
approved, a court may look to this definition for guidance."
Under this proposed definition, if a mixed transaction
involves software or embedded software contained in a good,
it is likely excluded from Article 2."
A court may also look to UCITA.6 ° UCITA provides a set
of default rules for the licensing of computer information and
software, and is intended to govern transactions involving
computer information.6 Such transactions include computer
programs, Internet and database access, as well as data
processing contracts. UCITA defines information as "data,
text, images, sounds, mask works, or computer programs,
56. See Lousin, supra note 4, at 913 (indicating that only when the scope of
a statute is determined may the terms and basic principles of the statute be
defined).
57. "Computer information means information in electronic form which is
obtained from or through the use of a computer or which is in a form capable of
being processed by a computer." 2002 Proposed Amendments to U.C.C. Art. 2,
supra note 5, § 2-103(b). Webster's Dictionary provides limited assistance,
defining information as "knowledge communicated by others or obtained from
investigation, study, or instruction .... " WEBSTER'S 3D NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1160 (1993). Black's Law Dictionary
is less helpful, defining "information" as it is typically used in the legal context,
as "a formal criminal charge made by a prosecutor without a grand-jury
indictment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 783 (7th ed. 1999).
58. "Information means data, text, images, sounds, mask works, computer
programs, software, databases, or the like, including collections and
compilations. The term includes computer information." 2002 Proposed
Amendments to U.C.C. Art. 2, supra note 5, § 2-103(m). "Computer information
means information in electronic form which is obtained from or through the use
of a computer or which is in a form capable of being processed by a computer."
Id. § 2-103(b).
59. "Information means... software.. . ." Id. § 2-103(m).
60. UCITA was promulgated by NCCUSL in 1999 and to date has been
enacted in Maryland and Virginia. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II § 22-101
(2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-501.1 (Michie 2001); Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v.
DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323, 1331 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
61. See U.C.I.T.A. Prefatory Note, § (a) (2002).
62. See id. § 103 cmt. 2(b), (c), (e).
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including collections and compilations of them.""
Regardless of the definition a court uses, if it finds that a
transaction involves information, it is instructed not to apply
Revised Article 2.' However, difficulties arise when a
transaction consists of both goods and information.65
D. A Tale of Two Tests
Courts face an analogous dilemma when dealing with
mixed transactions that involve goods and services.6 To
determine the source of law that applies to these mixed
transactions, courts have developed different tests." Most
courts apply the predominant purpose test to determine
whether services or goods are the predominant purpose of the
transaction." Where the sale of goods is the dominant
purpose and labor is incidentally involved, the predominant
purpose test holds that Article 2 will apply to the entire
transaction.69 Conversely, a few courts have applied the
gravaman test.7° Under this test, a court first determines
63. Id. § 102(a)(35).
64. See 2003 Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, §§ 2-102, 2-103(k).
65. See Micro Data Base Sys., Inc. v. Dharma Sys., Inc., 148 F.3d 649, 655
(7th Cir. 1998) (discussing whether custom software should be considered a
mixed transaction or a sale of goods). The Revised Article 2 drafting
committee's struggle with this issue is reflected in the numerous attempts to
formulate a rule to address mixed transactions with respect to scope. See
discussion supra note 32.
66. See De Filippo v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 1313, 1323 (3d Cir. 1975);
Yorke v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 474 N.E.2d 20, 22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Anthony Pools
v. Sheehan, 455 A.2d 434, 437 (Md. 1983).
67. See Data Processing Servs., Inc. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492 N.E.2d
314, 318 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); Anthony Pools, 455 A.2d at 437.
68. See Insul-Mark Midwest, Inc. v. Modern Materials, Inc., 612 N.E.2d
550, 553-54 (Ind. 1993); Lousin, supra note 4, at 915.
69. See 1 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-
102:4 (2001); Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974).
70. See Data Processing Serv., Inc., 492 N.E.2d at 318; Skelton v. Druid
City Hosp. Bd., 459 So. 2d 818, 821-22 (Ala. 1984); Charles E. Cantu, A New
Look at an Old Conundrum: The Determinative Test for the Hybrid
Sales/Service Transaction Under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, 45 ARK. L. REV. 913, 934 (1993) (indicating that a number of courts have
adopted the gravamen test in situations that involved the U.C.C.). Anthony
Pools is often cited as an example of the gravaman approach. See HAWKLAND,
supra note 69, § 2-102:4 n.10; Cantu, supra. A closer look at the holding in
Anthony Pools reveals that the court adopted the test under limited
circumstances, specifically when monetary loss or personal injury is alleged to
have resulted from a defect in consumer goods. See Anthony Pools, 455 A.2d at
441.
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whether the dispute centers on the goods or the services
aspect of a mixed transaction, and if the claim pertains to the
goods, then Article 2 applies. 1 Eminent U.C.C. scholar,
William D. Hawkland indicates that "unless uniformity would
be impaired," it may be easier to use the gravaman test in
mixed transactions. 72
Although most courts have adopted the predominant
purpose test, UCITA applies a gravaman approach to mixed
transactions that involve goods and information.73 Some
authors indicate that this approach is more reasonable for
information transactions, and that the predominant purpose
test renders awkward results when applied to information
transactions.74  On the other hand, because emerging
technologies have become increasingly intertwined, some
authors point out that it is becoming increasingly difficult to
draw a clear distinction between embedded and non-
embedded software, even for computer scientists. 5  The
drafting committee proposed revised comments to the scope
provision of Revised Article 2 that indicated the Article
neither endorsed nor rejected either test.7 ' NCCUSL did not
approve these revised comments and the scope provision
remains largely unchanged 7  In fact, some authors have
suggested that the preservation of the scope provision phrase
"transactions in goods" indicates that the drafting committee
intended to ensure that case law interpreting that phrase
71. See In re Trailer & Plumbing Supplies, 578 A.2d 343, 345 (N.H. 1990).
The court in this case indicated that it might consider applying the gravaman
test in a future case under appropriate circumstances. See id.
72. See HAWKLAND, supra note 69, § 2-102:4. The Seventh Circuit has
indicated a willingness to apply the gravaman test if a dispute is clearly
assignable to either the goods or services aspect. See Micro Data Base Sys., Inc.
v. Dharma Sys., Inc., 148 F.3d 649, 654-55 (7th Cir. 1998).
73. See Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA)
§ 103(b)(1) (2002); Lousin, supra note 4, at 916.
74. See Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software
Transactions, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 459, 540 (2000).
75. See Charles Shafer, Scope of UCITA: Who and What Are Affected in
UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTION ACT: A BROAD PERSPECTIVE
(Stephen Y. Chow et al., co-chairs, 2001); Philip Koopman & Cem Kaner, The
Problem of Embedded Software in UCITA and Drafts of Revised Article 2 (pt. 1),
43 UCC BULLETIN, Release 1, 1, 2 (2001). Previous drafts of Article 2 attempted
to draw a distinction between software embedded in goods subject to Article 2
and non-embedded software subject to UCITA. See id. at Release 2, 1, 6.
76. See 2002 Proposed Amendments, supra note 5, § 2-102 cmt. 2.
77. See 2003 Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, § 2-102.
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remains intact, and therefore, a court should apply the test it
has already adopted. 78 However, there appears to be growing
support for the conclusion that a gravaman test is more
appropriate in mixed goods/information transactions.79
If the court uses the gravaman approach, then it will
apply Revised Article 2 to the goods portion of a transaction,
and non-Article 2 law to the information portion. ° If the
court uses the predominant purpose test and determines that
the main purpose of the transaction is goods, then it will
apply Revised Article 2.81 Similarly, if the main purpose of
the transaction is information, then a court will apply non-
Article 2 law.82  Therefore, just as the definition of
"information" can determine the applicable law, the mixed
transaction test that a court decides to apply can also have a
significant impact on the source of law that will govern a
transaction, and thus the contractual rights of the parties.88
E. The Current State of Information Transaction Codes and
Case Law: Source ofLaw and Warranties
As discussed above, regardless of the definition or the
test that is applied, courts are now instructed not to apply
Revised Article 2 to transactions that consist solely of
information and mixed transactions where information is the
predominant purpose or the gravaman of the action. 4 This
instruction may indicate a departure from, or perhaps a
clarification of, the approach of current case law, which has
been described as "garbled" with respect to whether or not
computer information falls within the definition of goods and
the purview of Article 2.5
Some authors have indicated that disputes involving
software development contracts are "roughly equally divided"
78. See Lousin, supra note 4, at 916.
79. See Brennan, supra note 74, at 540. UCITA and prior drafts of Article 2
appear to adopt a gravaman-type approach. See Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act (UCITA) § 103(b)(1) (2002); 1997 Annual Meeting
Draft of U.C.C. Art. 2, supra note 32, § 2-103; Cantu, supra note 70, at 935
(advocating for a gravaman approach for products liability disputes).
80. See HAWKLAND, supra note 69, § 2-102:4.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See NIMMER, supra note 8, § 9:2.
84. See 2003 Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, §§ 2-102 cmt. 2, 2-
103(k).
85. See Lousin, supra note 4, at 917-18.
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as to whether the transaction involves goods or services."
Others assert that the current trend in case law is toward the
application of intellectual property principles rather than
U.C.C. provisions. Computer information cases have thus
far typically involved the sale or licensing of software, and
many courts treat software as a good, especially when it is
sold as prepackaged software.88 Other courts have indicated
that software disputes are best categorized as a service,
typically when the dispute does not involve warranty claims
under Article 2.89 This conflicting result may indicate that
one underlying debate with regard to source of law involves
implied warranties, and specifically, which warranties, if any,
should apply to information transactions. 90
1. UCITA
For the two jurisdictions that have adopted UCITA, the
courts have a complete and new body of uniform law to apply
to an information transaction.91 Modeled after the U.C.C.,
this body of law provides express and implied warranties for
information transactions.92  UCITA has undergone
amendments almost annually since it was promulgated in
1999.9' It currently provides several relevant definitions,
including "computer information," "computer information
transaction," and "information."94 Like Revised Article 2, the
UCITA definition of "goods" includes all things moveable, and
excludes computer information. 95 The UCITA scope provision
currently indicates that if the transaction is mixed, UCITA
86. See Nimmer, supra note 39, at 35.
87. Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29 n.13 (2d Cir.
2002).
88. See Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 674-76 (3d Cir.
1991); NIMMER, supra note 8, § 6:4.
89. See NIMMER, supra note 8, § 6:4.
90. See id.
91. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II § 22-101 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-
501.1 (Michie 2001). Legislation in at least three states has expressly denied
UCITA's application to a contract for which UCITA laws govern, and negated
contract terms that indicate UCITA will govern the contract. See IOWA CODE
§ 554D.104(4) (2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-329 (2002); W. VA. CODE § 55-8-15
(2002).
92. See U.C.I.T.A. §§ 402-05 (2002).
93. See U.C.I.T.A. § 103 (Annual Meeting Draft 1999); U.C.I.T.A. § 103
(2000); U.C.I.T.A. § 103 (2002).
94. U.C.I.T.A. § 102(10), (11), (35) (2002).
95. Id. § 102(33).
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applies to the part of the transaction that involves computer
information." If the transaction involves a computer program
contained in goods, such as embedded goods, UCITA applies
to the computer program.97 In all other cases, UCITA applies
to the entire transaction if information is the primary subject
matter.98
With respect to warranties, UCITA includes numerous
implied warranties and provides for disclaimer of implied
warranties.9 Of the few cases that have acknowledged
UCITA, none have directly applied it, though a few have
indicated that UCITA provided support for a holding based on
other sources of law.'°° Therefore, there is little case law to
provide guidance for the courts or the parties as to how
UCITA warranties are to be applied."' Although controversy
96. See id. § 103(b)(1); Joseph A. Zavaletta & Edward B. Hymson, Widgets
to Windows.- The "Webolution" of Commercial Sales, 6 COMPUTER L. REV. &
TECH. J. 243, 259 (2002).
97. U.C.I.T.A. § 103(b)(1) (2002).
98. See id. § 103(b)(3). In addition, UCITA categorically excludes an
enumerated list of transactions from its purview, including financial services
and some motion picture transactions. See id. § 103(d)(1), (d)(3)(A).
99. See id. §§ 403-06. Although one UCITA warranty is titled "Implied
Warranty: Merchantability of Computer Program," the language of all the
UCITA implied warranties differs significantly from UCC warranties. See id;
U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (1995).
100. See Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29 n.13 (2d
Cir. 2002) (noting that UCITA has been adopted by Maryland and Virginia);
Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (indicating that UCITA provides guidance); Sagent Tech., Inc. v.
Micros Sys., Inc., No. JFM-02-2505, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14022, at *5 n.1 (D.
Md. Aug. 5, 2003) (indicating that although the Maryland legislature had
adopted UCITA, the dispute did not fall under the purview of UCITA because it
occurred before UCITA was enacted); AGT Int'l, Inc. v. Level 3
Communications, L.L.C., No. 02-CV-684, 2002 WL 31409879, at *5 (S.D. Ohio
July 29, 2002) (indicating that UCITA provided additional support for the
holding); i.LAN Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328,
332 (D. Mass. 2002) (indicating that the court would not spend time considering
UCITA because it had not been adopted by Massachusetts); Klocek v. Gateway,
Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1338 n.7 (D. Kan. 2000) (indicating that UCITA did
not apply to the court's analysis); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software
Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 313 n.10 (Wash. 2000) (indicating that UCITA provides
support for its holding); Page v. Hotchkiss, 2003 WL 22962151, at *3 n.2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Dec. 2, 2003) (indicating that UCITA has been adopted by two
states).
101. None of the disputes that mention UCITA involved an implied warranty
claim. See Specht, 306 F.3d at 20; Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A., 284 F.3d at 1325;
LLan Sys., Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d at 330; AGTInt'l, Inc., 2002 WL 31409879, at
*3; Kiocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1334; M.A. Mortenson Co., 998 P.2d at 307. In
addition, the language of UCITA warranties, though modeled after the UCC, is
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continues to surround UCITA,'0 it does provide a framework
of default express and implied warranties a court can apply,
as well as a scope provision to determine source of law for
mixed information transactions.'0 3
2. Article 2, Direct or Indirect Application
Courts have applied Article 2 to information
transactions, either directly or indirectly.1 0 4 Some courts have
found that Article 2 directly applies when software is sold in
the form of a disk or other tangible and moveable medium.1"'
The Seventh Circuit indicated that the weight of authority
holds that the sale of custom software is to be categorized as a
good, and applied Article 2.10 The court further indicated
that even if the sale of software also includes the service of
customizing the software, it should not be considered a mixed
transaction, in the same way that the sale of a car is not a
mixed transaction simply because its invoice indicates a
charge for the car separate from the labor charge for
customizing the car.'0 7
significantly different from that of UCC warranties. Compare U.C.I.T.A.
§§ 403-06 (2002), with U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (1995).
102. See Cem Kaner, Sotaware Engineering and UCITA, 18 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 435, 437-43 (2000) (noting that critics of UCITA include
twenty-four attorneys general, the American Intellectual Property Association,
and the Software Engineering Institute). In addition, three states have adopted
anti-UCITA legislation. See IOWA CODE § 554D.104(4) (2002); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 66-329 (2002); W. VA. CODE § 55-8-15 (2002); see also discussion supra note
91. Finally, Michael Traynor, President of ALI has indicated that the
"enactment of UCITA, as it now stands, would not be a beneficial development
for the law." See February 4 Letter to ALI Members on UCITA, supra note 17.
103. SeeU.C.I.T.A. §§ 103, 402-05 (2002).
104. See Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 676 (3d Cir. 1991)
(indicating strong policy arguments in favor of including software in the
U.C.C.); iLAN Sys., Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d at 332 (indicating that although
Article 2 did not technically apply to software licenses, it best fulfills parties'
expectations); Braucher, supra note 33, at 247 (indicating that when courts
apply Article 2 to software transactions, they often do not state whether they
are applying the article directly or indirectly by analogy).
105. See Multi-Tech Sys., Inc. v. Floreat, Inc., No. 01-1320 DDA/FLN, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4644, at *9 (D. Minn. Mar. 18, 2002) (citing Advent Sys. Ltd.,
925 F.2d at 675).
106. See Micro Data Base Sys., Inc. v. Dharma Sys., Inc., 148 F.3d 649, 654
(7th Cir. 1998).
107. See id. at 655 (indicating that labor is a service that is included in every
manufactured good). But see Pearl Invs., L.L.C. v. Standard [/0, Inc., 257 F.
Supp. 2d 326, 353 (D. Me. 2003) (indicating that a contract for the "development
of a software system from scratch primarily constitutes a service" and Article 2
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Other courts have found that the term "goods" within
Article 2 has an extensive meaning and should be interpreted
flexibly, because strong policy arguments favor the inclusion
of software in the U.C.C. 18 In addition, some courts have
found that Article 2 applies simply because the parties have
so stipulated. °9 Acknowledging that Article 2 may not
technically govern software licenses, one court has
nonetheless applied it, essentially by analogy, because it best
fulfills the parties' reasonable expectations."' Once a court
finds that a transaction falls within the purview of Article 2,
it can then look to the familiar warranties of Article 2, as well
as abundant Article 2 warranty case law for guidance in its
application."'
3. Common Law
a. Common Law of Contract
When a court finds that UCITA and Article 2 do not
apply to an information transaction, and the dispute is not
governed by intellectual property law, it is left with unwieldy
common law concepts of obligation and warranties."1 Some
authors indicate that a lack of organized, coherent contract
principles is one reason courts use U.C.C. concepts by analogy
in many cases that do not involve goods, including cases
involving service contracts. 113
Some courts have applied the common law of contracts to
does not apply).
108. See Advent Sys. Ltd., 925 F.2d at 676 (indicating that "the importance of
software to the commercial world and the advantages to be gained by the
uniformity inherent in the U.C.C. are strong policy arguments favoring [the]
inclusion" of software transactions within Article 2); Braucher, supra note 33, at
246 (indicating that "in deciding whether to apply Article 2 to hybrid
transactions... the courts look to policy considerations and ask whether the
particular Article 2 section in question functions well as the governing law for
the issue in question") (internal citations omitted).
109. See M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 310
(Wash. 2000).
110. See i.LAN Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level. Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328,
332 (D. Mass. 2002).
111. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (1995); HAWKLAND, supra note 69, §§ 2-314:1
n.5 & 2-315:1.
112. See Nimmer, supra note 39, at 54-55. "Computer service warranties
and disclaimers challenge us because there is not a lot of case law, no marked
trend, and an absence of clarifying codification." Feldman, supra note 42, at 1.
113. See NIMMER, supra note 8, § 9.2.
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disputes involving information and mixed information
transactions, and found that common law provides no
warranties unless the parties expressly agree.114  One court
found that a cable company provides only a service by merely
transmitting information, and declined to imply any
warranties when the plaintiff alleged service disruptions."5
Other courts have found that common law provides no
authority for implying warranties in business acquisitions
that predominantly involve intangible assets,' in mixed
transactions that predominantly transfer patents, 117 or in
sales of computer program codes." 8 Outside of Article 2, no
common law rules establish an implied warranty for a
product or an end result." 9
b. Common Law of Tort
Restatement (Torts) Section 299A provides a type of
service obligation, essentially a warranty that focuses on
performance of a contract. 2 ° If a person undertakes to render
services in the practice of a profession, that person is required
to exercise the skill normally possessed by members of that
profession.' This service obligation does not require a
specific end result; instead it focuses on performance. 2 This
obligation is consistent with a Williston comment, which
indicates that there is a promise in every service contract that
the "work will be rendered with reasonable care.""' Whether
grounded in tort or contract common law, this obligation
applies to service contracts and imposes a standard only on
the performance of the contract, not on the end product.
124
114. See Triple Point Tech., Inc. v. D.N.L. Risk Mgmt., Inc., No. CIV.A.99-
4888WHW, 2000 WL 1236227, at *8 (D.N.J. 2000); Fink v. DeClassis, 745 F.
Supp. 509, 516 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
115. See Kaplan v. Cablevision of Pa., Inc., 671 A.2d 716, 724-25 (Pa. 1996).
116. See Fink, 745 F. Supp. at 516.
117. See Novamedix, Ltd. v. NDM Acquisition Corp., 166 F.3d 1177, 1183
(Fed. Cir. 1999).
118. See Tuiple Point Tech., Inc., 2000 WL 1236227, at *8.
119. See Nimmer, supra note 39, at 45.
120. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
121. See id.
122. See Nimmer, supra note 39, at 45, 48.
123. Id. at 48.
124. See id. at 45, 48. This comment does not examine the complex issue of
the division between tort and contract law. It is sufficient to note that similar
obligations to perform service with reasonable care may be grounded in either
tort or contract law. See id. at 48, 50 n.179.
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Service obligations rarely require a certain result, perhaps
because many of those who provide services deal with factors
beyond their control.
115
A few courts have applied a tort standard of care in early
software disputes.'26 After applying the gravaman test to
bifurcate its analysis of a mixed software and hardware
transaction, the court in Data Processing Services, Inc. v.
L.H Smith Oil Corp. held that computer programmers "hold
themselves out to the world as possessing skill and
qualifications in their respective trades or professions [and]
impliedly represent they possess the skill and will exhibit the
diligence ordinarily possessed by well informed members of
the trade or profession. "" This case represents an early and
very brief trend in which courts applied a computer
malpractice standard, essentially an elevated duty of care."'
Other courts have applied a traditional negligence standard
to information disputes, and have indicated that every service
contract contains an implied promise that the work will be
rendered with reasonable care.129
The courts quickly rejected the application of a
reasonable or elevated standard of care in commercial
information transactions and began to favor breach of
warranty and other contract breach claims. 3 ' In a recent
dispute involving allegations of defective software, a
negligence liability claim failed to survive a demurrer;
however, claims asserting U.C.C. implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for particular purpose survived
the demurrer with little discussion.' Courts may have
rejected the tort standard of care approach because they
viewed the U.C.C. as flexible enough to encompass software
125. See Chem. Bank v. Title Serv., Inc., 708 F. Supp. 245, 247 (D. Minn.
1989).
126. See Ballman, supra note 44, at 425-26.
127. 492 N.E.2d 314, 318-19 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
128. See Ballman, supra note 44, at 425-26; Diversified Graphics, Ltd. v.
Groves, 868 F.2d 293, 295-96 (8th Cir. 1989).
129. See Nimmer, supra note 39, at 48; Invacare Corp. v. Sperry Corp., 612
F. Supp. 448, 453-54 (N.D. Ohio 1984). The British Supply of Goods and
Services Act 1982 § 13 provides for an implied term in all service contracts, that
is, a supplier of services acting in the course of business "will carry out the
service with reasonable skill and care." Feldman, supra note 42, at 3.
130. See Ballman, supra note 44, at 426.
131. See id. (citing Fishbein v. Corel Corp., 29 Pa. D. & C.4th 289, 297 (Pa.
C.P. Ct. 1996)).
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transaction disputes.132
At least one author asserts that some courts may apply a
"reasonable person" standard to the software industry, but
acknowledges two significant hurdles.1 33 First, the economic
loss doctrine prohibits tort recovery when a product damages
only itself, and does not cause personal injury or other
property damage.' The second hurdle is the general
unwillingness of courts to impose a higher duty of care on
software professionals,' 3 ' possibly because the software
profession does not satisfy the recognized factors that
characterize a profession to which a higher standard typically
applies.'
c. Common Law of Property
At first glance, property law may not appear to offer
much in the way of guidance for warranties in commercial
information transactions. "' However, many information
transaction disputes involve intellectual property law.' 38 In
addition, real property transactions typically involve a bundle
of rights, and courts have imposed quality standards for
specific rights within a property transaction. 1  For example,
title warranties may be imposed even though no implied
warranties apply to the physical state of the property.
14 0
Information transactions involve similar multiple, and even
132. See id.
133. See id. at 457.
134. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965). Thus,
because software claims likely do not involve damages for personal injury, the
economic loss doctrine would bar many of these claims. "Some categories of
loss, including those often referred to as 'pure economic loss,' are more
appropriately assigned to contract law and the remedies set forth in Articles 2
and 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROD. LIAB. §
21 cmt. a (1997). In fact, some economic loss has traditionally been excluded
from tort law even when no contractual remedy is available. See id.
135. See Ballman, supra note 44, at 457.
136. See Hosp. Computer Sys., Inc., v. Staten Island Hosp., 788 F. Supp.
1351, 1361 (D.N.J. 1992) (listing factors such as "extensive formal training...
admission to practice by a qualifying licensure, a code of ethics ... a system for
discipline . . . and, notably an obligation on its members, even in non-
professional matters, to conduct themselves as members of a learned,
disciplined, and honorable occupation").
137. See generally Fink v. DeClassis, 745 F. Supp. 509, 516 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
138. See Brennan, supra note 74, at 542.
139. See Craig W. Dallon, Theories of Real Estate Broker Liability and the
Effect of the 'As Is" Clause, 54 FLA. L. REV. 395, 407 (2002).
140. See id.
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conditional, rights.1 4 1
Although the law of personal property sales began to
develop implied warranties around the nineteenth century,
warranties in real property law have begun to develop only in
the last few decades.' The rule of caveat emptor has.
protected sellers from liability since the 1500s by imposing all
risks of defects in real property on the buyer.' However,
with respect to residential property transactions, courts have
recently limited this doctrine by implying warranties of
marketable title, habitability, and workmanship. 44  Courts
began to impose these warranties when they recognized and
accepted that circumstances and expectations in modern
industrialized society had changed. 4 For example, the court
in Melody Home Manufacturing Co. v. Barnes pointed to
several policy reasons for imposing implied warranties on
contracts to repair property,' 46 including a public interest in
protecting consumers from inferior service, and the fact that a
consumer of complicated services is "unable to independently
determine quality and must depend on the experience, skill,
and expertise of the service provider.' 47
At least one court has addressed a party's claim that an
implied warranty analogous to property warranties should
apply to a transaction involving trademarks, logos, and
licensing agreements. 48  However, because there was no
authority in common law, the court declined to extend
property warranties to transactions involving intangibles.
4
1
In addition, some courts have developed disclosure
duties, which impose a duty on sellers of residential property
to disclose known latent material defects.' ° Because a large
percentage of defects in mass-market software are known and
intentionally left unfixed, some authors have asserted that
141. See Nimmer, supra note 39, at 39-41 (noting that information rights are
often conditional and circumscribed, but are not limited to physical possession).
142. Dallon, supra note 139, at 402-05.
143. Id. at 401.
144. Id. at 405-08.
145. See Charles L. Armstrong, Note, Who Pays the Price for Defective Home
Construction? A Note on Beucher v. Centex Homes, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 687,
694-95 (2001).
146. 741 S.W.2d 349, 353 (Tex. 1987).
147. Id.
148. See Fink v. DeClassis, 745 F. Supp. 509, 516 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
149. See id.
150. See Dallon, supra note 139, at 409-10.
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software companies should be required to disclose known
defects in software to consumers."' They argue that although
software may be inherently imperfect, software developers
could be held accountable for known flaws through a duty to
disclose."2
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
Modern commercial transactions increasingly consist of
emerging technologies that include both goods and
information."3 Courts struggle with legal classifications and
definitions that are difficult to apply to these new
technologies."' This produces uncertainty as to the source of
law for some information transactions."' The Article 2
drafting committee attempted to address the status of these
new technologies," 6 and Revised Article 2 now directs courts
to exclude information from its scope. '57 However, Revised
Article 2 does not provide a definition for "information" or any
clear rule that would assist the court in determining when a
transaction includes "information.
158
Although many aspects of commercial law may change as
a result of the revisions to Article 2, one of the most
important aspects is the exclusion of information from the
purview of Article 2."' The Article's scope determines the
source of law and the resulting rights and obligations of
parties to commercial transactions, including the availability
151. See Kaner, supra note 102, at 454-56.
152. See id.
153. See Anecki, supra note 44, at 397; Ballman, supra note 44, at 436-37.
154. See Nimmer, supra note 39, at 6.
155. See Nimmer, supra note 39, at 43; Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925
F.2d 670, 674-75 (3d Cir. 1991) (indicating that software is an elusive concept
and holding that it is a "good" within the definition of U.C.C.); i.LAN Sys., Inc.
v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (D. Mass. 2002).
156. See Kinstlick, supra note 20.
157. See 2003 Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, § 2-103(k).
158. Compare 2003 Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, § 2-103(k),
with 2002 Proposed Amendments, supra note 5, § 2-103(m). In his discussion
regarding whether UCITA, Article 2 by analogy, or "judicial common-law
creativity" should apply to computer information transactions, ALI President,
Michael Traynor, indicated that "the ALI is investigating the possibility of a
project about how courts should apply the principles of contract law to
transactions in smart goods and information." See February 4 Letter to ALI
Members on UCITA, supra note 17, at 3.
159. See 2003 Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, § 2-103(k).
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of implied warranties. 6 ' Parties to future information
transaction disputes, as well as courts, will soon confront new
challenges as a result of this revision."' Among these
challenges are the unknown effects of the revised scope of
Article 2 within the context of information transaction
disputes. 112 Predicting how a court will determine the source
of law for mixed goods/information transactions presents
additional challenges. 6 Finally, if Article 2 no longer applies
to a mixed goods/information transaction, parties to a dispute
will need to know which, if any, implied warranties are
available at common law."M
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Two Threshold Questions for Source of Law
1. "Information"
If a state adopts the revised definition of "goods," its
courts will face two important threshold issues in information
transaction disputes. 6' First, a court must decide how to
define "information."'66 The proposed Article 2 definition of
"information" was similar to that of UCITA, but it is
significant that NCCUSL did not approve this definition.167 A
court could find that NCCUSL's decision not to adopt this
definition, where it has so done with UCITA, indicates that
this definition is not to be used when Revised Article 2
potentially applies.' Because the courts are left to determine
this definition with no guidance from Revised Article 2,
greater uncertainty as to the source of law and less
160. See NIMMER, supra note 8.
161. See 2003 Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, § 2-103(k).
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See generally Nimmer, supra note 39, at 45-48.
165. See 2003 Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, § 2-103(k).
166. See id.
167. Compare 2002 Proposed Amendments, supra note 5, § 2-103(m), with
U.C.I.T.A. § 102(35) (2002). NCCUSL did not incorporate this definition into
the final draft that it submitted to ALI for approval. U.C.C. § 2-103 (Approved
Amendments by NCCUSL 2002) (on file with author). It may also be significant
if the court is in a jurisdiction that has adopted anti-UCITA legislation. See
discussion supra note 91.
168. "Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius." Data Processing Serv., Inc. v. L.H.
Smith Oil Corp., 492 N.E.2d 314, 318 (4th Cir. 1986).
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uniformity among the states may result.1 69  On the other
hand, it is likely a court will rely on previous cases, and
employ a fact-based comparison to determine if the
transaction in question involves information, which may
enhance certainty for parties to a dispute.
170
Courts faced with a dispute involving software have
substantial case law to look to for guidance. 17' However,
emerging technologies, which have little case precedent, may
be difficult to categorize as software, information, or
moveable goods. 172  There is no definition of information in
Revised Article 2, and arguably no practical division between
embedded and non-embedded information. 73 Without case
law or statutory guidance beyond the directive to exclude
information, courts will soon have considerably broad
discretion of interpretation. 1 74  Revised Article 2 essentially
transfers the task of developing new definitions and tests to
determine whether a transaction is to be categorized as
information out of the hands of uniform code drafters and into
the hands of the courts. 175 After ten years and seven drafts,
the drafting committee has been unable to successfully codify
a clear test to determine whether the scope of Revised Article
2 would extend to certain information transactions. 76
169. See 2003 Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, § 2-103(k); see also
February 4 Letter to ALIMembers on UCITA, supra note 17, at 3.
170. See generally Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284
F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
171. See Novamedix, Ltd. v. NDM Acquisition Corp., 166 F.3d 1177, 1183
(Fed. Cir. 1999); Micro Data Base Sys., Inc. v. Dharma Sys., Inc., 148 F.3d 649,
655 (7th Cir. 1998); Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 674 (3d Cir.
1991); i.LAN Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332
(D. Mass. 2002); Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1338 n.7 (D.
Kan. 2000); Hosp. Computer Sys., Inc. v. Staten Island Hosp., 788 F. Supp.
1351, 1361 (D.N.J. 1992); Fink v. DeClassis, 745 F. Supp. 509, 516 (N.D. Ill.
1990); Data Processing Serv., Inc. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492 N.E.2d 314, 318
(Ind. App. 4 Dist. 1986); Kaplan v. Cablevision of Pa., Inc., 671 A.2d 716, 724-25
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1996); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998
P.2d 305, 313 n.10 (Wash. 2000).
172. See generally Nimmer, supra note 39, at 38-43.
173. See Shafer, supra note 75; Koopman & Kaner, supra note 75.
174. See 2003 Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, § 2-103(k); see also
February 4 Letter to ALIMembers on UCITA, supra note 17, at 3.
175. See Speidel, supra note 18, at 608 (noting the potential tension in the
partnership between ALI and NCCUSL and indicating that "[a] common
method of resolving these disagreements is to. . . 'leave it to the courts'").
176. See Speidel, supra note 19, at 789-91; Lousin, supra note 4. On the
other hand, some authors indicate that the decision to address computer
software outside of Article 2 has reduced the need to revise Article 2. See
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Nevertheless, the courts are now expected to take up this
daunting challenge. 7
2. Predominant Purpose v. Gravaman Test
When a court finds that a transaction includes
information, as it has defined it, as well as moveable goods,
the court then faces either a mixed transaction or an
embedded goods transaction."8 Here, a second, and familiar,
threshold issue is whether to use the predominant purpose or
gravaman of the action test to determine source of law for
mixed information transactions. 79 The gravaman test has
never received the status or attention that the predominant
test has received.80 The gravaman test is often referred to as
the minority test, or viewed as a secondary test to be used
when a dispute is conveniently and easily divisible.'
Because many transactions are not so easily divisible,
some courts have indicated that the gravaman's bifurcated
analysis is unworkable where components of a transaction
are intertwined. 2 In addition, some courts have expressed
an unwillingness to apply the gravaman test in cases where
the dispute involves overarching issues that apply to the
whole transaction and cannot be partially applied, such as
statute of frauds or statute of limitations.83 Either the
contract is valid under the statute of frauds or it is not;
parties would not expect the sale of the tangible portions of a
washing machine to be an enforceable transaction, while the
licensing of the software inside the machine to be invalid and
unenforceable. Further, when an information dispute
involves a defect, the gravaman test as applied to emerging
Maggs, supra note 37, at 598.
177. See Speidel, supra note 18, at 608.
178. See Micro Data Base Sys., Inc. v. Dharma Sys., Inc., 148 F.3d 649, 654
(7th Cir. 1998).
179. See id. at 654-55; Yorke v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 474 N.E.2d 20, 22 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1985); Insul-Mark Midwest, Inc. v. Modern Materials, Inc., 612 N.E.2d
550, 553-55 (Ind. 1993); Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 455 A.2d 434, 438-40 (Md.
1983).
180. See Lousin, supra note 4, at 916.
181. See Insul-Mark Midwest, Inc., 612 N.E.2d at 554-55; Micro Data Base
Sys., Inc., 148 F.3d at 654.
182. See Insul-Mark Midwest, Inc., 612 N.E.2d at 554-55.
183. See De Filippo v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 1313, 1323 (3d Cir. 1975);
Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 676 (3d Cir. 1991).
184. See Advent Sys. Ltd., 925 F.2d at 676.
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technologies would arguably render some disputes a battle of
the experts.'85 Courts would take on the task of determining
if the alleged defect was located in the lines of software code
or in the hardware or in some other tangible portion of the
product.'86  Courts may have adopted the predominant
purpose test because they found that it best meets the parties'
expectations, can be flexibly applied to new situations and
evolving transactions, and is simply an easier tool for
indivisible transactions.'87
Despite these potential hurdles, the gravaman approach
has received more attention recently.'88 Its adoption into
UCITA is somewhat surprising, given that so few
jurisdictions have applied the test, let alone accepted it as the
general rule.' 9 The drafting committee for Article 2 appeared
to apply the gravaman test in many of the previous drafts of
the scope provision, but the approved Revised Article 2
remains silent on the issue."'
As with the definition of "information," Revised Article 2
leaves this issue to the courts.' The scope provision of
Revised Article 2 remains silent and its unmodified language
appears to preserve the common law rules as to the
185. See Koopman & Kaner, supra note 75, at Release 3, 1, 4-5 (describing
examples of embedded and non-embedded software and indicating that
circumstances surrounding some information transactions creates confusion
because more technical facts become relevant when determining if software is
embedded or not).
186. See id. at Release 1, 1, 3 (indicating that a designer could change the
design of an information product to ensure that it falls under a particular source
of law).
187. See Insul-Mark Midwest, Inc., 612 N.E.2d at 554-55; Anthony Pools v.
Sheehan, 455 A.2d 434, 437-38 (Md. 1983).
188. See Brennan, supra note 74.
189. Even in cases where the test is applied, courts often apply it in very
limited circumstances. See Anthony Pools, 455 A.2d at 441 (indicating that it
would apply the gravaman test when injury results from consumer goods even
though services predominate); In re Trailer & Plumbing Supplies, 578 A.2d 343,
345 (N.H. 1990) (applying the predominate purpose test and indicating it may
consider the gravaman test in future disputes).
190. See 2003 Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, § 2-102. A
proposed comment that was not approved by NCCUSL addressed this issue but
remained neutral as to which test a court should apply. See 2002 Proposed
Amendments to U.C.C. Art. 2, supra note 5, § 2-102 cmt. 2. In addition, the
current Article 2 is silent on this issue. See U.C.C. § 2-102 (1995).
191. See 2003 Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, § 2-103(k)
(indicating, in a preliminary official comment, that it is "up to the courts" to
decide whether or to what extent Revised Article 2 applies to a transaction that
involves both the sale of goods and the transfer of rights in information).
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application of these tests.'92 When a court finds that a dispute
involves a mixed information transaction, it will likely apply
the test that its jurisdiction has adopted. 9 ' The Revised
Article's neutral approach allows more flexibility than
previous drafts that appeared to adopt the gravaman
approach.9 4  In addition, an extensive body of case law
provides examples of how to apply these tests and can help
courts determine source of law for mixed transactions.' 95 This
body of case law is more familiar and can arguably lend
sufficient certainty to mixed information transaction
disputes, or at least as much certainty as currently exists. '96
B. Revised Article 2 as Applied- Implied Warranties: A
Common Law Void
Revised Article 2 potentially excludes some transactions
that previously would have been resolved under Article 2.19'
Because some courts have only reluctantly or indirectly
applied Article 2 to software transactions, courts may now
interpret the new definition of "goods" as a directive not to
apply Revised Article 2 to some transactions that were
previously within its purview. 198
This potential exclusion may not significantly affect those
cases where Article 2 and common law concepts are similar.199
For example, a recent court decision relied on the common
law defense of bona fide purchaser, stating that the common
law rule comported with both Article 2 and UCITA, and thus
192. See Lousin, supra note 4, at 914, 916.
193. See Data Processing Serv., Inc. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492 N.E.2d 314,
318 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (indicating that the court would apply the gravaman
test after noting that its jurisdiction has adopted the test).
194. Compare 1996 Annual Meeting Draft of U.C.C. Art. 2 § 2-103, available
athttp://www.law.upenn.edu/bll, with U.C.C. § 2-102 (1995).
195. See HAWKLAND, supra note 69, § 2-102:4 n.5, n.10.
196. See id.
197. See Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323,
1330-31 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
198. See i.LAN Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328,
332 (D. Mass. 2002). On the other hand, courts might look at the comment to
the definition of goods and determine that although Article 2 should not apply
directly to electronic transfers of information, the Article may apply to
transactions that include information so long as intellectual property rights are
not altered. See 2003 Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, § 2-103(k)
cmt.
199. See Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A., 284 F.3d at 1330-31; Specht v. Netscape
Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 28 (2d Cir. 2002).
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avoided the question of which three should apply. °°
Similarly, another court found that both common law and
Article 2 principles require manifestation of agreement
between the parties in order to find existence of a contract,
and held that the source of law issue did not need to be
reached.2 ' Therefore, where all potentially applicable law
produces the same result, the exclusion of information from
the scope of Revised Article 2 will not have a practical
effect.
202
In contrast, common law and Revised Article 2 produce
very different results under implied warranty claims.2 3
Because common law provides no implied warranties for non-
goods, Revised Article 2 potentially leaves some mixed
goods/information disputes in a common law void.204 This is a
significant change for consumers who have little bargaining
power and are not able to negotiate express warranties for
software.0 5 Therefore, the exclusion of some information
transactions from the purview of Revised Article 2 has a
potentially significant impact on consumers of information
products.26 This section will discuss some of the common law
tort, contract, and property causes of action that may be
available to a party alleging an information product defect
when Revised Article 2 does not apply.2 7
1. Tort (or Contract)
When courts initially rejected the computer malpractice
theory, they were able to turn to Article 2 to imply
warranties.2 8 With Revised Article 2, they may once again
have the opportunity to explore the possibility of imposing an
elevated standard of care, or a general standard of care, upon
software merchants. 20 9 This opportunity potentially creates
greater uncertainty for information transaction disputes
200. See Rhone-Poulenc Agro, SA., 284 F.3d at 1330-31.
201. See Specht, 306 F.3d at 28.
202. See id.
203. See Nimmer, supra note 39, at 43-44.
204. See id. at 45.
205. See generally Kaner, supra note 102, at 459-62.
206. See id.
207. See infra Part IV.B.1-3.
208. See Ballman, supra note 44, at 426.
209. See Data Processing Serv., Inc. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492 N.E.2d 314,
319-20 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
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because courts have less case law upon which to rely."'
Parties entering into a contract would not be able to estimate
their risk because the standard of care that may be imposed
is uncertain. " The common law of contracts does not provide
for implied warranties for non-goods.212 Therefore, in the
absence of Article 2 warranties, an information consumer
may have to assert a tort claim and argue that some standard
of care should be imposed.21
One hurdle for such a claim is that the software
profession probably does not satisfy many of the factors used
to determine whether a profession should be held to the
higher standard of professional care.214 In addition, several
courts have declined to impose such a standard.215 A second
hurdle is the economic loss doctrine, which limits damages to
contractual remedies when the losses are purely economic.216
Assuming, arguendo, that a party is able to get around
the economic loss rule, a common law tort or contract claim
may exist.217 Though courts do not imply warranties in
service contracts, they will find obligations in common law,
which are somewhat analogous to warranties.2 8  Where
obligations exist in the service context, they usually involve
skill level, and may be grounded in tort or contract. 219 This
obligation does not require that the service be free from
defects, only that the service be performed with reasonable
care.2 1 In contrast, Article 2 implied warranties focus on the
end result; the product should be merchantable or fit for a
particular purpose. 22' Although Article 2 is not a consumer
210. See Ballman, supra note 44, at 426 (discussing the very brief trend of
applying a computer malpractice standard).
211. See id. at 440.
212. See Nimmer, supra note 39, at 45.
213. See id. at 48-52.
214. See Hosp. Computer Sys., Inc. v. Staten Island Hosp., 788 F. Supp.
1351, 1361 (D.N.J. 1992).
215. See id.; Invacare Corp. v. Sperry Corp., 612 F. Supp. 448, 453-54 (N.D.
Ohio 1984).
216. See Ballman, supra note 44, at 457.
217. See generally id.
218. See Feldman, supra note 42, at 2 (discussing the connection between
warranty and tort).
219. See Nimmer, supra note 39, at 48.
220. See id. at 45, 48.
221. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (1995). These warranties have remained
largely unchanged in Revised Article 2. See 2003 Approved Draft Amendments,
supra note 6, §§ 2-314, 2-315.
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protection code, it has provided protection for consumers of
defective goods since its inception,222 and its strict liability
warranties impose a higher standard than the service
obligation's reasonable person standard.223
Although such a tort or contract claim may exist for
service contracts, it is questionable whether it exists for
information transactions, because information may be neither
a service nor a good. 224  When a buyer purchases and
downloads software from the Internet, the transaction likely
consists solely of information; 25 however, that buyer may also
purchase the same software in prepackaged CD-form from an
electronics store.226 Courts usually characterize this latter
transaction as a transaction in goods.227 For example, virus
protection software can be purchased and downloaded from
the merchant's web site, or purchased in the form of a CD
from an electronics store.2 8 Both transactions produce the
same result; buyers are purchasing protection from viruses
for their computers, but each transaction may be
characterized differently.229
From the buyer's perspective, these are the same
transactions, and the buyer expects to receive the same
quality and essentially the same product.2 ' Because quality
expectations are the same, the buyer's rights, obligations and
remedies should also be the same, regardless of how the
transaction is categorized."' In addition, although a buyer
222. See Greenfield, supra note 33, at 293. In addition, it is not clear if
consumer protection legislation, such as the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,
applies to software. See Kaner, supra note 102, at 460; 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (2002).
223. Compare U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315, with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 299A (1965).
224. See Nimmer, supra note 39, at 37-38 (indicating that information differs
from goods and services and describing an "information/goods/services
trichotomy").
225. See Brennan, supra note 74, at 536-37.
226. See id.
227. See Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 674-76 (3d Cir.
1991).
228. See McAfee Security Products & Services, at
http://www.mcafee.com/myapps/default.asp (last visited Jan. 25, 2003).
229. See Maggs, supra note 37, at 618 (indicating that because not all sales of
computer software involve a transfer of moveable goods, determining whether
Article 2 applies is more difficult); see generally Brennan, supra note 74, at
1137-38.
230. See generally Kaner, supra note 102, at 459-60, 467-69.
231. See Feldman, supra note 42, at 4.
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may purchase a specific developer's virus protection software
in part because he believes that it was developed with better
skill, the buyer more likely purchases that software because
he thinks it is the best product available to protect his
23
computer. 232 The typical consumer, who has limited
knowledge of programming, purchases a result, a tool, and
the superior skill with which that tool was developed means
nothing to the buyer if the product does not do what it says it
will in fact do.233 Therefore, although emerging information
transactions seem to defy legal classification in terms of
moveable goods or services, from the buyer's perspective,
some information transactions are indistinguishable from
buying goods, such as a toaster or a padlock.234 Article 2
warranties better reflect these expectations than tort or
contract common law service obligations.235
2. Property
Unlike the industrial era in which Article 2 was
originally drafted, consumers today are less equipped to
inspect the products they typically buy.236 Though they may
be competent to inspect a toaster or padlock, most buyers are
not skilled in the inspection of virus protection software.237
Real property law addressed an analogous transformation in
the past decades, when the nature of tenants changed from
primarily agrarian to urban industrial. 238  Buyers began to
view a real estate transaction primarily as the purchase of a
house rather than the land on which it sits. 23
9
Courts responded to this change by developing implied
warranties of title, habitability, and workmanship.24 ° When
the character and nature of the consumer in real estate
232. See generally Kaner, supra note 102, at 467-69.
233. See id.; Braucher, supra note 33, at 249 (indicating that Article 2 is
sufficient for many issues that arise in software disputes because software is
largely a functional product; end users purchase software as a functional
product rather than as a collection of services).
234. See Kaner, supra note 102, at 467-69.
235. See generallyU.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (1995).
236. See Brennan, supra note 74, at 460 (characterizing the era of the
original Article 2 drafting process as an industrial economy and mass produced
goods).
237. See Kaner, supra note 102, at 467-68.
238. See Dallon, supra note 139, at 404-05.
239. See id. at 404-05.
240. See id. at 405-10.
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transactions transformed, courts implied warranties to
provide some protection.141 Courts may now face a similar
scenario with regard to some information transactions.14' The
policies articulated by the courts when they imposed property
warranties are applicable to certain consumer information
transactions.243 Most consumers cannot determine the quality
of information products and depend on the expertise of the
merchant.44  Therefore, if only common law applies to an
information transaction, a court could look to property law as
precedent for judicially created implied warranties or
disclosure duties. 5
Prior to Revised Article 2, one court declined an
invitation to expand such warranties to a mixed information
transaction. 246 However, if the exclusion of some information
transactions under Revised Article 2 leaves consumers with
too little protection, a party could argue that the court should
reexamine the option to extend judicially imposed warranties
or impose disclosure duties on software merchants.247
In sum, unless a court (1) finds the economic loss doctrine
does not prevent a tort claim or (2) decides to impose
warranties or duties as it has with property disputes, little
common law protection exists for consumers of some
information products.248  This is particularly so when
performance of the contract-the development of the
software-meets the reasonable service standard, but the end
result is a defective product that does not do what the
merchant claims it will do. 9
V. PROPOSAL
Information transactions are becoming increasingly
common; arguably, they should not be considered
"emerging."50 The uniform code drafting process has failed to
241. See id. at 404-05.
242. See id.
243. See Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 353 (Tex. 1987).
244. See id. (indicating a similar policy reason for implied warranties in real
estate transactions).
245. See generally Dallon, supra note 139, at 405-11.
246. See Fink v. DeClassis, 745 F. Supp. 509, 516 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
247. See id.
248. See generallyBallman, supra note 44, at 457.
249. See generally Nimmer, supra note 39, at 45, 48.
250. See Brennan, supra note 74, at 462 (indicating that the copyright
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promulgate successfully a set of rules to address these
important commercial transactions.251  After five years,
UCITA has been enacted in only two states.252 Because
Revised Article 2 essentially leaves information transaction
issues to the courts, some commerce disputes may be left with
common law rules where before they may have fallen under
the purview of the familiar and developed Article 2 uniform
law.258
Significantly, Revised Article 2 does provide a great deal
of flexibility for the courts. 2 4 As applied to mixed information
transactions, its scope can be interpreted more narrowly or
more broadly than that of Article 2 and previous revision
drafts.255  Because the code does not define "information" or
direct the court to apply a particular mixed transaction test,
2 6
courts have more discretion than they would have under
previous drafts of Revised Article 2.57 The courts now have
an opportunity to develop tests where the drafting committee
has thus far been unable to do successfully.25 This discretion
provides the flexibility necessary for emerging transactions,
and allows for an adaptive approach to inevitable and
industry, a major component of the software industry, now rivals the size of the
manufacturing sector); Zavaletta & Hymson, supra note 96, at 261.
251. Only two states, Maryland and Virginia, have adopted a form of UCITA.
See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II § 22-101 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-501.1
(Michie 2001). In addition, legislation in at least three states has expressly
denied UCITA's application to a contract for which its laws govern, and negates
contract terms that indicate UCITA will govern the contract. See IOWA CODE §
554D.104(4) (2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-329 (2002); W. VA. CODE § 55-8-15
(2002).
252. Only Maryland and Virginia have enacted UCITA. See MD. CODE ANN.,
COM. LAW II § 22-101; VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-501.1.
253. Compare 2003 Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, § 2-103(k),
with U.C.C. § 1-103 (1995).
254. See generally 2003 Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, § 2-
103(k). Further, the preliminary official comment indicates that the Article
"does not directly apply to an electronic transfer of information. . . ." Id.
(emphasis added). In addition, this comment indicates that although the Article
may apply to a transaction that includes information, the Article does not alter
intellectual property rights. Id. This comment appears to indicate that Article 2
could be applied indirectly to a mixed goods/information transaction, so long as
intellectual property rights remain unchanged. Id.
255. See discussion supra note 32.
256. See 2003 Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, §§ 2-102, 2-103(k);
U.C.C. § 2-102 (1995).
257. See discussion supra note 32.
258. Id.
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219
continuous changes in today's commerce.
In addition, courts should be aware of the significance of
this discretion, and carefully consider how to define
"information," because the definition determines whether
transactions are excluded from Revised Article 2, and can
have a significant impact on the rights and obligations of
parties. 6' Until the courts develop a clear definition or test,
the source of law that will govern information transactions
will be at least as uncertain under Revised Article 2 as it was
under Article 2.261 Also, courts should follow case law and
continue to use the predominant purpose test, particularly
when a transaction is not easily divisible. 6 ' Because there is
more case law to refer to under the predominant test than the
gravaman test, this approach will provide more certainty to
both parties and best meets their expectations.263
With this discretion, however, comes the possibility that
some mixed goods/information transactions that previously
would have been resolved under Article 2 may now be
excluded and fall under common law." Currently, common
law does not provide a convenient framework that addresses
information transactions, particularly with regard to implied
warranties.265  Common law may not adequately protect
modern consumer expectations. 266  Further, the exclusion of
information from Revised Article 2 potentially creates
inconsistent remedies for essentially the same product,
simply because the method of transaction varies.267 Therefore,
when exercising this new discretion, courts should consider
consumer expectations and the changing nature of the
consumer with respect to emerging technologies. 66
259. See generally MILLSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41; Nimmer, supra note 41.
260. See 2003 Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, § 2-103(k); see also
discussion supra note 254.
261. See generally 2003 Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, § 2-
103(k); discussion supra note 254.
262. See Insul-Mark Midwest, Inc. v. Modern Materials, Inc., 612 N.E.2d
550, 554-55 (Ind. 1993); Micro Data Base Sys., Inc. v. Dharma Sys., Inc., 148
F.3d 649, 654-55 (7th Cir. 1998).
263. See Lousin, supra note 4, at 916.
264. Compare 2003 Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, § 2-103(k),
with U.C.C. § 1-103 (1995).
265. See generally NIMMER, supra note 8.
266. See generally Kaner, supra note 102, at 459-60, 467-69.
267. See Feldman, supra note 42, at 4.
268. See generally Armstrong, supra note 145; Braucher, supra note 33, at
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Finally, if Revised Article 2 is adopted by the states,
courts will have the opportunity not only to develop new tests
and rules, but also to influence future rules for information
transactions. Because it is likely that efforts to codify and
promulgate default rules for these important commercial
transactions will continue, uniform code drafters will be
paying close attention to how the courts treat the wide
discretion left to them by Revised Article 2.269
VI. CONCLUSION
After a decade of drafting, Revised Article 2 has at last
arrived.27 One important change is the definition of "goods,"
which now excludes "information."271 This revision effectively
alters the scope of Article 2, and thus potentially affects the
source of law for information transactions, specifically mixed
information transactions and embedded goods. 2  Common
law rather than Article 2 may now govern some of these
273transactions. Common law does not reflect modern
consumer expectations, particularly with regard to defective
information and mixed goods/information products. 274 Revised
Article 2 provides the courts with a great deal of flexibility to
interpret the term "information" as well as the choice of
which test to apply to determine source of law for these mixed
transactions.2 5 This discretion allows courts the opportunity
to develop new tests and default rules regarding the scope of
Revised Article 2, and will likely affect how source of law for
mixed information transactions will be determined in the
future. 6
246-52, 258-59 (indicating that a functional approach to classification in this
context would result in treating copies of software as goods when they are sold
as "products").
269. See 2003 Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, § 2-103(k); see also
discussion supra note 158.
270. See Council Approves Article 2 Amendments, supra note 17, at 3.
271. See 2003 Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, § 2-103(k).
272. See Lousin, supra note 4, at 916.
273. Compare 2003 Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, § 2-103(k),
with U.C.C. § 1-103 (1995).
274. See generally Kaner, supra note 102, at 459-62.
275. See 2003 Approved Draft Amendments, supra note 6, § 2-103(k); see also
discussion supra note 158.
276. See generally Lousin, supra note 4, at 913.
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